

BRIEF ON THE CONFLICTS IN THE HIGH AND MIDDLE PLATEAUS OF UVIRA, FIZI AND KALEHE, DRC

Introduction

This brief provides an overview of the literature on conflicts in the Upper and Middle Plateaus of Uvira, Fizi and Kalehe. The paper is structured around the four dimensions of conflict analysis: profile, causes, actors and dynamics. Particular attention will be paid to the current trends and dynamics of these conflicts in relation to the M23-AFC rebellion.¹

Conflict profile

With an area of 65,070 km², the province of South Kivu comprises eight territories and four cities.³ Externally, it shares borders with Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. Within DRC, it borders the provinces of North Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika. It is home to a multitude of ethnic groups including the Babembe, the Bazoba, the Babwari, the Bagoma, the Bazimba, the Soba, the Bafuliru, the Barega, the Bashi, the Babuyu, the Hutu, the Tutsi, the Pygmies, the Bahavu, the Batembo, the Bahunde, the Banyanga, the Barongeronge, the Banyindu, the Bavira, the Bazoba and the Barundi.⁴ The Uvira-Fizi-Mwenga High and Middle Plateaus region is a vast area covering three different territories and encompassing the living environment of several communities.

Most studies tend to show that conflicts in the region center on land, power, and identity.⁵ Conflicts are experienced across all these territories, though to varying degrees of intensity. The territories where violence is most rife are those of Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga (High and Middle Plateaus) and the northern territory of Kalehe (Kalehe High Plateaus). In the High and Middle Plateaus of Uvira (Bijombo) – Fizi (Minembwe) – Mwenga (Itombwe), the conflict has strong communal overtones and is rooted in disputes over the management of transhumance, land tenure, resource management and land use, as well as issues of identity; it pits the Tutsi community against the Bafuliru, Banyindu and Babembe communities, whilst also involving intra-communal conflicts. In the Kalehe Highlands, identity-based conflicts mainly concern access to customary and political power. They also revolve around access to land and pit the group that considers itself ‘indigenous’ – the Havu, Tembo, Rongeronge and Pygmies – against the group considered ‘migrants’ – the Hutu and Tutsi.⁶ The issue of the distribution of administrative and customary power between the Havu and Tembo communities is also raised, with the latter calling for the creation of an autonomous Bunyakiri territory of their own. This territorial move is contested by the Havu community because they wish to retain a monopoly on the management of the

¹ March 23 Movement-Congo River Alliance

² https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/south_kivu_factsheet._fre.pdf (consulted December 18, 2024).

³ These include Kalehe, Idjwi, Kabare, Walungu, Uvira, Fizi, Mwenga et Shabunda, plus the cities of Bukavu, Uvira, Kamituga and Baraka.

⁴ Pool d'appui à la stabilisation des experts de la société civile congolaise, *Analyses croisées de conflits à l'est de la RD Congo*, Mars 2017, p. 10. https://peaceworkafrica.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Publication_pool_4.pdf

⁵ Léon Irengé, *Conflict Analysis in South Kivu and Tanganyika Provinces (DRC)*, Search For Common Ground- Tuendelele Pamoja (TP), November 2017, p.16.

⁶ APC (Action pour la Paix et la Concorde), *Analyse du contexte du territoire de Kalehe*, Novembre 2022.

territory.⁷ Communities are mobile and therefore forge alliances with armed groups in neighboring areas, a factor that contributes to expanding violence.⁸

The causes of these conflicts

The causes of conflicts are neither uniform nor static. They vary from one village to another and from one region to another.⁹ Generally speaking, the root causes are linked to structural factors that are immutable or very difficult to change; they are either shaped by geographical, societal, or institutional dynamics that evolve very slowly. In the middle and high plateaus, conflicts center on mobilization around ethnic identity, which is closely linked to access to economic resources, particularly land and customary and political power. The order in which the root causes are discussed below does not reflect their relative importance.¹⁰

In the Uvira-Fizi-Mwenga High and Middle Plateaus, conflicts are of a different nature and pit the Bafuliru, Banyindu and Babembe against the Banyamulenge.¹¹ These conflicts relate not only to identity, power and leadership, but are also linked to transhumance¹² and land tenure. They pit farmers – generally comprising the Bafuliru, Banyindu and Babembe – against the Banyamulenge, who are generally herders. According to Bosco Muchukiwa¹³, the root causes of these conflicts in the High and Middle Plateaus centre on the fragility of the Congolese state, breaches of the law, and the status of traditional chiefs, which forms the basis of a parallel administration within communities and villages. In some localities, there is one community chief appointed by the territorial administration and another by a provincial authority, yet both belong to different communities. Additionally, the social unrest arising from Bijombo community members’ – including Bavira and the Banyamulenge – challenges to legal authority and shifts in legitimacy. Challenges to legitimacy extend to the territory or rural commune of Minembwe.¹⁴ This ‘social unrest’ linked to territorial claims is exacerbated by the proliferation of

⁷ Idem.

⁸ Verweijen, Judith, et al. “Mayhem in the Mountains. How Violent Conflict on the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu Escalated.” Governance in Conflict. Insecure Livelihoods Brief., 2021.

⁹ Wenceslas Busane Ruhana Mirindi et Philippe Kaganda Mulume-Oderhwa, Analyse des dynamiques des conflits autour du parc national de kahuzi-biega (PNKB), USAID’s Solutions for Peace and Recovery, July 2021, p. 27.

¹⁰ FAO, République démocratique du Congo: Analyse de conflits dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu –Rapport complet. Rome, 2023, p.22; <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc7526fr>.

¹¹ BUREAU CONJOINT DES NATIONS UNIES AUX DROITS DE L’HOMME (HCDH-MONUSCO), Note analytique sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans les hauts plateaux des territoires de Mwenga, Fizi et Uvira, province du Sud-Kivu, entre février 2019 et juin 2020, août 2020, p. 20.

¹² CONGO PEACE CENTER, ‘Workshop on cattle transhumance and conflicts in the territories of Fizi, Mwenga, Uvira and Walungu in South Kivu’ in General Report on the workshops examining the links between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and conflicts in the provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri, Kinshasa, September 2023, p. 27 et seq. See also, on this subject, Provincial Decree No. 008/GP/SK of 14 February 2019 regulating the practice of domestic animal husbandry in South Kivu Province.

¹³ Bosco Muchukiwa (PhD)&Marcellin Kasagwe, Conflits dans les moyens et les hauts plateaux de Fizi, Mwenga, et Uvira : facteurs d’escalade, modus operandi des acteurs et crise politique régionale en perspective, ISDR-Bukavu Août 2019.

¹⁴ <https://www.observatoirepharos.com/pays/republique-democratique-du-congo/affaire-minembwe-banyamulenge-et-conflits-communautaires-au-sud-kivu/>. Lire aussi : <https://www.observatoirepharos.com/pays/republique-democratique-du-congo/affaire-minembwe-banyamulenge-et-conflits-communautaires-au-sud-kivu/>.

community-based armed militias.¹⁵ In the Kalehe Highlands, the conflicts stem from the demands for customary and land autonomy made by the Tutsi and Hutu populations vis-à-vis the Havu and Tembo customary authorities. In some local communities, Hutus and Tutsis form the majority but are administered and governed politically by community leaders from another community (Tembo, Havu and Rongeronge).¹⁶ This situation is thought to stem from the fact that the Hutus and Tutsis arrived in the area after these other communities had already established a system of customary governance across the entire region. Consequently, they assert their right to appoint and be governed by their own traditional chiefs, and to decide for themselves how the land they occupy is managed and distributed.

In most of the studies cited, the immediate causes—which stem from the root causes—are primarily linked to the proliferation and radicalisation of ethnically-based armed groups; unregulated land transactions give rise to overlapping land titles due to the duality of land law.¹⁷ Furthermore, the persistence of clandestine artisanal mining results in smuggling of minerals. These conditions induce a high prevalence of negative perceptions between communities, breaches of transhumance management protocols, and the quest for customary power. In the same vein, there is opposition to modern authority linked to the creation and management of administrative entities,¹⁸ the administration of taxation within these entities, challenges to the appointment of group and village leaders, administrative duplication, the absence of military and police authority, and land grabbing by the urban and political elite.¹⁹ The proliferation of community-based armed groups in the three zones that constitute these new power centres is contributing to the radicalisation of inter-community conflicts. The conflicts in the High and Middle Plateaus manifest themselves through widespread insecurity, attacks and overt acts of violence by armed groups, banditry,²⁰ resource extraction, taxation, threats, abuses and predation by the defence and security forces. Aggravating factors include the socio-economic vulnerability of the population, the widespread circulation of weapons, and porous borders that facilitate access to these territories by foreign armed groups and destabilise local communities. In both areas, the conflicts are triggered by

¹⁵ Bizuru Ntibonera Phanuel, 'The socio-security and humanitarian context in the highland areas of the territories of Fizi, Uvira, Itombwe and Mwenga', a presentation at the National People's Forum for Inter-Community Peace, organised by ANU (United Nations Association) – DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) at the RIO (Organisational Innovation Network), 4–5 July 2019, cited by Bosco Muchukiwa.

¹⁶ Deborah S. Roger (PhD), *Le conflit entre Tembo et Havu dans le territoire de Kalehe affecte la communauté des peuples autochtones*, Réseau Initiative for Equality (IFE), 2021. <https://initiativeforequality.org/wp-content/uploads/Conflit-entre-Tembo-et-Hutu-dans-le-territoire-de-Kalehe-avril-2021-FR.pdf>

¹⁷ This duality in land law can be explained by the coexistence of a statutory legal system and a customary legal system governing land ownership in the DRC.

¹⁸ The case of the disputes that arose when the Minembwe Commune was established and which continue to this day. For further information, see the following links: <https://www.dw.com/fr/en-rdc-tensions-grandissantes-autourde-minembwe/a-55209700>; <https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite77254-minembwe-une-commune-de-creation-illegale.html>

¹⁹ Bosco Muchukiwa and Marcelin Kasagwe, 'Conflicts in the Fizi Mwenga Midlands and Highlands, and Uvira: factors contributing to escalation, the modus operandi of the actors, and the regional political crisis in perspective', ISDR-Bukavu, August 2019.

²⁰ Vinck P, Pham PN (2014). *Searching for Lasting Peace: Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes about Peace, Security and Justice in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, United Nations Development Programme. 2014, p. 47. Continued reading on this subject, Séverine Autesserre, *The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World*, Oxford University Press, 2021. Also read Jocelyn Kelly, *Seeking the whole picture of Congo violence*, by Alvin Powell, *The Harvard Gazette*, National & World Affairs, April 22, 2009.

murders, abductions, the destruction of fields by livestock, the killing and/or looting of livestock, rapes, the illegal occupation of land, and the creation of one entity within another (as in the specific case of Minembwe).

Conflict actors

In all these areas, the main actors are armed gangs engaged in looting, theft and blocking roads; community-based armed groups claiming to protect members of their respective communities; community leaders; herders and farmers fighting to protect their fields or livestock; traditional authorities who act as arsonists;²¹ political actors and members of the diaspora who manipulate young people for their own political gain. Several studies note that South Kivu is affected by recurring conflicts between a multitude of actors, including numerous national and foreign armed groups and armed forces that are motivated to control territories and/or illegally exploit natural resources.²² South Kivu, particularly the High and Middle Plateaus, have been the scene of conflicts characterised by human rights violations and international crimes committed by both state and non-state actors.²³ Armed groups are firmly entrenched in the area, leaving certain areas beyond the control of the authorities. As researchers have noted, far from being a historical accident, "armed groups are an integral part of the province's economic and political system."²⁴ Indeed, armed groups engage in the illegal exploitation of natural resources (minerals and timber). This enables them to integrate into the economic system through mafia-style transactions in order to enrich themselves and self-finance their operations.²⁵ Added to these are the multitude of local, ethnically based armed groups, including the Gumino, the Twingwaneho, the Android (with Banyamulenge connotations), the Mai-Mai Ebwela, the Mai-Mai Yakutumba (with Bembe connotations), the Mai-Mai Mushombe (with Fuliru connotations), the Mai-Mai Kakobanya and the Bilonze Bishambuke (with Banyindu connotations),²⁶ as well as other smaller Mai-Mai groups. All these groups, with the exception of those with Banyamulenge connotations (the

²¹ This was the case with Mr. Justin BITAKWIRA's peacekeeping mission. He was dispatched by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the territories of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga to persuade various warlords to lay down their arms and bring peace to this region plagued by armed groups. There were several envoys from the Presidency on this mission, but many voices were raised suggesting that his presence on such a high-profile mission could work in his favour, as he would return and tell the people that without him the war could go on indefinitely in these areas. The full article is available at: https://actualite.cd/2020/11/23/sud-kivu-felix-tshisekedi-depeche-justin-bitakwira-pour-une-mission-de-pacification-dans?fbclid=IwY2xjawJJVPBleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHZBvTtbfeIOMfLrhkXV4fJELBO3EpPMg_KdB_pDdDIRYMa6DyrkwHvCTWQ_aem_TICK6Y_pjP0J8xyl8yB8ZQ. Please also read: Koen Vlassenroot (undated), Amir Sungura, Ndakasi Ndeze, Murenzi Mbamba, Hadji Rugambwa and Limbo Kitonga, 'The Politics of the Past and the Present'. Conflict in Northern Kivu in the east of the DRC: change and continuity, Insecure Livelihoods series / July 2021. This GEC publication, although concerning North Kivu, highlights the role played by arsonist 'firefighters' in a cyclical conflict.

²² RDC Protection Cluster, Protection Analysis: Protection Situation in South Kivu in the Context of MONUSCO's Withdrawal, March 2024, p. 3.

²³ Valérie Arnould et al., Pursuing an Integrated Approach to Transitional Justice and DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, GIC and Lawyers Without Borders, 2024, p. 7. Further information on international crimes in the DRC can also be found at: <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/countries/africa/2010-drc-mapping-report>; https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/pe_tition_mapping_-_dernie_re_version_finale.pdf

²⁴ Idem.

Ann Laudati, 2013. "Beyond minerals: broadening 'economies of violence' in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(135), pp. 32–50, March.

²⁶ ADEPAE-LPI, Analysis of conflict dynamics and opportunities for peace in the Kigoma and Minembwe districts, Research report, Bukavu, March 2022.

Ngumino and Twigwaneho), have adopted the banner of the Wazalendo, which means ‘true compatriots’, and are reportedly preparing to join the Wazalendo on the front line in North Kivu in order to position themselves for future integration into the FARDC²⁷. The FARDC believe that these armed groups should not join the FARDC without first undergoing training and are insisting on legislation to regulate the status of reservists within the army.

There are also reports of the presence of Mai-Mai Kirikitcho and two Hutu factions, Pareco Zero and Sendugu Museveni’s Pareco FF, based in Ziralo, in the north of Kalehe.²⁸ Several corroborating sources indicate that these latter two groups claim to be fighting to protect the Hutu population but are suspected of playing a double game.²⁹ They readily collude with opportunistic generals in the FARDC and politicians involved in the production and export of minerals to Rwanda.³⁰ It should be noted that this alliance between armed groups and the national army is an unnatural partnership. The proof of this is that armed groups in the Congo have economic, political, and identity-based agendas. The alliance of some of these groups with the FARDC illustrates the ambiguous role of the army, certain elements of which are more interested in plundering resources than in protecting the population.

Foreign armed groups find themselves embroiled in hostilities shaped by local developments due to the political-military operators active at the national level. In the Upper and Middle Plateaus of Uvira-Fizi-Mwenga, Rwandan and Burundian armed groups are reported to have infiltrated various towns in Minembwe and Bijombo in 2022, areas which have effectively become a regional battlefield.³¹ Among these groups are the Red Tabara (a Burundian militia group reportedly formed by the Kigali regime to overthrow the Bujumbura regime)³², the Imbonerakure (militias of the Burundian government who are said to have come to monitor and thwart all Red Tabara initiatives and to track down other Burundian rebel armed groups based in the Hauts Plateaux, namely the National Liberation Forces (FNL) and the Popular Forces of Burundi (FOREBU), which oppose the current regime in Burundi).³³ In 2023, the DRC and Burundi, through the Task Force (comprising Burundian military personnel), decided to pool their efforts to track down the Red Tabara as part of a bilateral counter-insurgency policy; it was then that the latter changed their positioning and even their alliances. Recently, the Red Tabara have been allied with Ngoma Nzito’s Biloze Bishambuke, but they are wandering through the forests of Lulenge, in Fizi territory.³⁴

The fact that the dynamics of conflict and violence are intertwined at various levels renders simplistic the widespread notion that the violence in the Great Lakes region is the result of “foreign interference

²⁷ Op. Cit.

²⁸ Delphin Birimbi, interviewed by telephone in Kalehe, February 2, 2024.

²⁹ Josaphat Mussamba, cited above.

³⁰ Nord-Kivu : les sinueux circuits de l’exploitation illégale du coltan, Africa Intelligence, 142 rue Montmartre, Paris, Joan Tilouine.

³¹ Jean Battory et Thierry Vircoulon, La province du Sud-Kivu : un champ de bataille multidimensionnel méconnu, Notes de IFRI, February 2019.

³² Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 2023. <https://docs.un.org/en/s/2024/432>

³³ Idem.

³⁴ Josaphat MUSAMBA

and manipulation.” It is true that the involvement of foreign armed forces has fuelled the violence, but this has mainly occurred through their alliances with or support for Congolese armed groups, which have generally willingly agreed to collaborate with these forces.³⁵

Conflict dynamics and current trends

This chapter outlines the situation prior to the M23 crisis of January 2025, and the situation following the events of January 2025. During January 2024, MONUSCO³⁶ carried out a mission to Mikenge to inform the population of the Hauts Plateaux of its withdrawal and the handover of its armed group demobilisation activities to the PDDRC-S.³⁷ The Banyamulenge in these areas are said to have expressed their fears following MONUSCO’s withdrawal, worrying about attacks by local armed groups given that the PDDRC-S is not yet operational in the Hauts Plateaux.³⁸ To corroborate this view, a researcher notes that some Banyamulenge are said to have already left to settle in the camps for Burundian displaced persons in Lusenda, whilst others have gone to the Bibokoboko camp.³⁹ Despite the sense of fear amongst the Banyamulenge, a certain lull had been observed until recently in the High and Middle Plateaux. Victims of the atrocities organized various dialogue sessions in 2022 in Minembwe. These dialogues bore some fruit and made it possible to reopen the Mbundamo market, to facilitate passage along various routes linking different towns, and to set up joint teams comprising the FARDC, the Task Forces and self-defence groups to carry out patrols and accompany local people as they went about their daily activities.⁴⁰ Consequently, the various activities involved in transporting essential goods from the Hauts Plateaux to Uvira were carried out peacefully. At the conclusion of these talks, the participants had identified two routes to facilitate their journeys from the Hauts Plateaux to Uvira. Nevertheless, certain reports detailing contacts (and the possibility of M23 infiltration into the Hauts Plateaux) between the Banyamulenge self-defence groups and the M23 are exacerbating tensions between the various communities and fuelling anti-Banyamulenge sentiment.

As of January 2025, the High and Middle Plateaux of the territories of Fizi, Uvira, Mwenga and Kalehe remain highly fragile and a cause for concern. There has been a resurgence in the activities of armed groups formed to protect their communities, leading to conflicts⁴¹ because each community has its own self-defence group. These competing groups often clash in their goal to protect the interests of its own community. The situation in Fizi, Uvira, and Mwenga is characterised by radicalisation and hate speech on both sides, particularly between the Banyamulenge community and the other communities, which rely on armed groups aligned with their respective factions. As for the territory of Kalehe, which lies on the border between North Kivu and South Kivu, its population has been severely affected by the M23

³⁵ Judith Verweijen et al, op cit

³⁶ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

³⁷ Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program

³⁸ Op. Cit.

³⁹ Yves Ramazani, a researcher at GLPI/Gitega, interviewed on February 27, 2024.

⁴⁰ Josaphat Mussamba; PhD researcher in political science at Ghent University, interviewed in Bukavu on 25 February 2024.

⁴¹ WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH KIVU (GTJT/SK), Report on documentary research into cases of serious crimes committed in South Kivu from 1994 to 2024, Research carried out with the support of TRIAL International, July 2024, pp. 7–8.

war⁴² and lives in fear that the conflict will reach their territory. The M23 conflict has contributed to the resurgence of local armed groups which are positioning themselves to prevent the M23 from entering the Kalehe territory (some members of armed groups who had already been demobilised have rejoined local armed groups).⁴³

Recent conflict dynamics also involve a resurgence of closely interlinked local, national and regional (Great Lakes Region) tensions. The situation in the region is that, supported by Rwanda⁴⁴, the M23 has swept into South Kivu via the town of Minova. At the regional level, there has also been an escalation of proxy wars⁴⁵ waged by clandestine armed groups across porous borders, which have contributed to the prolongation of these conflicts as the actors and issues at the heart of these battles are constantly shifting. In light of all the above, in South Kivu province, worrying internal dynamics are emerging, with consequences⁴⁶ such as communities and/or entities failing to cooperate, and militias scattered here and there across all territories. Consequently, the logic of war and/or conflict prevails. It should also be noted that the M23/AFC conflict is becoming regionalised. The presence on Congolese soil of rebel groups from neighbouring countries – the Mai-Mai in general, the Red Tabara, the Forebu, the FNL, the Rwandan army alongside the M23, the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and the AFC – signals a dark turning point in the history of the Great Lakes Region⁴⁷. This is because it poses the risk of destabilising security across the entire Great Lakes region and/or the whole of Africa, given the alliances that will form to support one side or another involved in the hostilities. The closure of Rwanda's border with Burundi is another clear indication that the region has entered a new era of confrontation and hostilities.

⁴² In the DRC, the M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, seized the town of Minova at the end of January; it is a strategic commercial hub on the road to Goma. Article available at: <https://www.dw.com/fr/larm%C3%A9e-congolaise-confirme-la-prise-de-minova-par-le-m23/a-71365855> (accessed on 29 January 2025).

⁴³ The most recent case in South Kivu involves the Provincial Minister of the Interior, Mr Albert Kahasha Murhula, alias Foka Mike, who has decided to temporarily step down from his post and join the fighting on the ground. Read more on the resurgence of armed groups, notably the Wazalendo, in articles by Nafissa Amadou, 'The Wazalendo have become allies of the Congolese army', available at <https://www.dw.com/fr/les-wazalendo-ennemis-d-hierdevenus-des-alli%C3%A9s/a-68451579> (accessed 7 February 2024). In this article, Mr Josaphat Musamba (a researcher specialising in the dynamics of armed groups) is quoted as saying: "Not all of them have served in the army, but among them there are some who are former soldiers. Some have deserted the army. But what is clear is that the majority are young people who have been trained in the culture of combat."

⁴⁴ For further reading on this subject, see INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 'The Fall of Goma in the DRC: Urgent Action Needed to Avert a Regional War', published on 28 January 2025 (accessed on 29 January 2025 at 2.00 pm); 'The Fall of Goma in the DRC: Urgent Action Needed to Avert a Regional War'

⁴⁵ Josaphat Musamba, Against the 'Kimilikitisation' of the Rwandan Defence Forces in the east of the DR Congo, GEC-SH, 22 June 2021: available at <https://gecshceruki.org/contre-la-kimilikitisation-des-forces-rwandaïses-de-defense-dans-lest-de-la-rd-congo/> (accessed 30 January 2025).

⁴⁶ Mr F. MULUMEODERHWA, Mr G. MUGISHO, C. RUSHIGIRA, Mr P. BIGANIRO, N. S. VWIMA, N. G. MUSHAGALUSA, 'Adaptation strategies and household food security in the Minembwe highlands of South Kivu', in *Agronomie Africaine* 32 (2): 207–220 (2020).

⁴⁷ For further reading on this subject, see Kilomba Sumaili, A. (2015), 'THE ICGLR AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: THE CASE OF THE M23 REBELLION' in *Revue Québécoise de droit international / Quebec Journal of International Law / Revista quebequense de derecho internacional*, 28 (1), 203–218, <https://doi.org/10.7202/1067899ar>

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Key informants

1. Josaphat Musamba ; chercheur doctorant en sciences politiques à l'Université de Gand ; interviewé à Bukavu,
2. Kaningini Kyoto, Didace, interviewé à son bureau à Bukavu,
3. Jules Thambwe, interviewé à Uvira via le téléphone le 3 mars 2024,
4. Godelive Lugambo, Présidente du bureau de coordination de la société civile d'Uvira, interviewée à Uvira,
5. Yves Ramazani, chercheur GLPI/Gitega interrogé à partir d'Uvira
6. Jules Thambwe, activiste de la société civile d'Uvira interrogé par téléphone à partir d'Uvira.
7. Delphin Birimbi, président du cadre de concertation de la société civile de Kalehe.